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 Abstract Scientific and statistical inferences build heavily on explicit, parametric
 models, and often with good reasons. However, the limited scope of parametric mod-
 els and the increasing complexity of the studied systems in modern science raise the
 risk of model misspecification. Therefore, I examine alternative, data-based inference
 techniques, such as bootstrap resampling. I argue that their neglect in the philosoph-
 ical literature is unjustified: they suit some contexts of inquiry much better and use a
 more direct approach to scientific inference. Moreover, they make more parsimonious
 assumptions and often replace theoretical understanding and knowledge about mech-
 anisms by careful experimental design. Thus, it is worthwhile to study in detail how
 nonparametric models serve as inferential engines in science.
 Keywords Models • Data • Inductive inference • Nonparametric statistics •
 Bootstrap resampling
 1 Probabilistic modeling
 Modeling plays a key role in empirical science, especially when overarching theo-
 ries cannot be applied. Many efforts in science focus on constructing, comparing and
 revising models of physical entities, phenomena and processes. Bohr's model of the
 atom, Volterra's model of predator-prey populations and the random walk model for
 the motion of molecules in a fluid are among the most popular ones. Models enable
 us to recognize fundamental relations between physical quantities, to understand the
 effects of causal interventions and to generalize observed effects to more complex
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 and realistic cases. Often, their construction is triggered by concrete puzzles: For in-
 stance, Volterra (1926) developed his mathematical model of predator-prey population
 dynamics in response to the surprising shortage of adriatic fish after World War I. Vol-
 terra's model started from abstract considerations, but its predictions were found to be
 in stunning agreement with reality (see Weisberg's (2007) case study for more details).
 The way the Volterra model has been developed, refined and transferred to other scien-
 tific inquiries exemplifies a general strategy: to set up mathematically tractable models
 which capture fundamental mechanisms of the underlying system, and to gradually
 amend and refine them in order to account for the complexity of large-scale systems in
 the real world. In other words, models allow us to discover characteristic regularities
 (e.g. cycles in the population dynamics) as well as to explain concrete phenomena,
 such as "why does a disruption in fishing activity increase the predator/prey ratio?"
 Hence, it is not surprising that philosophers of science have been spending a lot of
 paper on the various features of model-building. In particular, they studied the function
 of models as explanatory engines and the differences to straightforward descriptions
 and empirical generalizations. Here, it has been pointed out that modelers make indi-
 rect inferences about the target system: they study a (mathematical) model and hope
 that the results, when transferred to the target system, remain approximately valid
 (cf. Weisberg 2007, 2009). Moreover, constructing definite models presupposes knowl-
 edge about mechanisms and causal interactions within a system, but on the other hand,
 the technique of indirect inference also improves our structural understanding, and
 leads to more reliable predictions (cf. Godfrey-Smith 2006). Volterra's predator-prey
 model exemplifies both of these features, as shown above.
 This mechanistic ideal of modeling ceases to apply whenever data obey apparently
 random patterns or when observations are disturbed by noise. In such cases we replace
 deterministic relationships by probabilistic models that are tailor-made to reasoning
 under uncertainty. The remainder of my paper focuses on probabilistic models that
 have invaded almost all natural and social sciences, but I see no obstacles to generalize
 my conclusions to deterministic models.
 Definition 1 A parametric statistical model 1 is an ordered triple (A' A, (Pů)ůe&)
 where ( X , A) is a measurable space (usually called the sample space) and (P#)fle0
 is a family of probability measures on (X, A).2
 In this definition, the sample space X corresponds to the set of possible observations
 whereas the a-field A has only technical meaning, defining the set of 'measurable' sub-
 sets of the sample space. Crucially, (P^)^€© gives a family of probability distributions
 on ( X , A ), which describe one and the same sampling mechanism (i.e. the mechanism
 that generates the data). The parameter ů that calibrates the sampling mechanism is,
 however, unknown. By restricting the set of sampling distributions to a parametric
 family, the uncertainty about the structure of the underlying sampling mechanism is
 removed. Instead, all uncertainty attaches now to the value of the unknown parameter
 ů which we can try to infer from the observations we make: "this restriction and [. . .]
 Often, the terms 'parametric (statistical) model' and 'statistical model' are used interchangeably.
 2 Cf. Cox (2006).
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 parametrization should aid one in understanding and efficiently estimating the [true]
 distribution."3
 But how do those mathematical constructions that we call statistical models connect
 to real systems? To what extent do they serve inferential tasks and indirect inference?
 Well, in the same way that deterministic models do. Morgan and Morrison state that
 formalizing a sampling process by means of a statistical model
 "[. . .] provides a model for a certain type of situations thought to exist in the real
 world and for which statisticians have well worked-out theories."4
 In other words, statistical models are the crucial link between stochastic theory and
 the real world. One of the best-known illustration for Morgan and Morrison's claim
 is the coin flip model. A coin is either fair or biased towards one of the two sides,
 and we represent the probability that it comes up 'heads' by a parameter ů. When
 the coin is tossed repeatedly (a sequential Bernoulli trial), this is supposed to tell us
 something about the model parameter ů. And if we represent the number of heads by,
 let's say, the Binomial distribution, this codes our causal knowledge that there are just
 two possible outcomes in each trial, that the trials are independent from each other,
 etc. As we will soon see, extensions of that very simple model can represent a wide
 number of complex processes in science.
 An extension of the coin flip model is the random walk - a discrete stochastic
 process that describes 'random' wandering on a rectangular grid. In genetics, those
 random walks are used to describe the variation of allele frequencies on a gene in a
 given population, e.g. for simulating genetic drift. But actually, random walks also
 serve as simplified models of the Brownian motion in hydrodynamics that describes a
 molecule's motion in a fluid. The Brownian motion is one of the most important dif-
 fusion processes in physics and has numerous (mathematically) beautiful attributes:
 It is a martingale with quadratic variation, has Normally distributed increments, the
 Markov property, etc. The abundance of mathematical tools and analytical results that
 can be used in working with the Brownian motion underlines the power of this model
 and explains why it is often applied outside hydrodynamics, too, e.g. for modeling
 financial markets.
 Now, it is crucial to note that the scale limit of the random walk (if steps are
 made infinitely small) is just the Brownian motion. So parametric models do not only
 facilitate our analysis of real systems: there are also beautiful connections between
 different parametric models (e.g. extended coin flip models and Brownian motions)
 that enhance our understanding of physical phenomena and helps us to see how they
 are related. So it does not come as a surprise that statistics textbooks in empirical
 sciences as well as philosophers of science stress "the explicit need of a [parametric]
 model in analyzing the significance of empirical data".5
 In particular, sophisticated testing procedures such as the F- and i-test have been
 designed for specific parametric models (here: the Normal distribution) and are widely
 3 Spirtes et al. (1993, p. 4).
 Morgan and Morrison ( 1 999, p. 33).
 5 Suppes (1969 [1962], p. 33). Cf. Mayo (1996) and Cox (2006).
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 used for testing scientifically relevant hypotheses. Intuitive and conceptually sound
 measures of evidence, such as the likelihood ratio and Bayes factors, are motivated by
 parametric assumptions (cf. Hacking 1965; Roy all 1997). Hence, parametric models
 play a distinguished role in inductive inference.
 In spite of all these virtues, I believe that the significance and indispensability
 of explicit parametric models in science has been overestimated. True, parametric
 modeling facilitates structural understanding as well as closed form computations and
 quantifying statistical evidence, but I argue that in scientific practice, valid conclusions
 can often be attained by means of nonparametric, data-based inference. Those meth-
 ods do not require understanding of some fundamental mechanisms in the system and
 are therefore immune to pitfalls of parametric modeling. Bootstrap resampling gives a
 convincing case study. Finally, I discuss to what extent nonparametric techniques can
 serve as inferential engines, contrast them to traditional, parametric approaches in sta-
 tistical modeling and argue that the former deserve more attention in the philosophical
 debate.
 2 Problems of parametric modeling
 There is a central problem for a parametric modeler: to specify the right family of
 models for the studied system. A parametric inference that is based on an inadequate
 family of distributions will easily go astray. This is the problem of model misspe -
 cification . To specify the right model, Ian Hacking (1965) gives three guidelines:
 analogy to other, relevantly similar questions of inquiry, scientific theory , i.e. the
 implications of our physical, biological, etc. background knowledge - in particular
 knowledge about causal mechanisms - and finally, simplicity : the mathematical anal-
 ysis must be feasible.6 When model specification fails, the entire inference is usually
 worthless, and this is the reason why so much literature has addressed model misspe-
 cification, even within the philosophical community. For instance, Mayo and Spanos
 (2004) extensively discuss techniques for detecting misspecification.7
 In general, correct model specification requires a lot of insights into the target sys-
 tem. The more complex the processes we deal with and the scarcer our theoretical
 understanding, the less we can be certain to have chosen the right model. When we
 analyze complex systems, model specification is often not sufficiently guided by the-
 oretical understanding. Causal relations between model variables may be unclear, the
 entire system may be too complex to model, no mathematically tractable distribution
 fits the specific values which the observations take, etc. Time series in econometrics
 and meteorology provide salient examples. We have to account for the uncertainty
 about the nature of the true distribution, and we cannot expect - as parametric models
 often do - nature to behave according to our wishes for mathematical convenience
 and structural simplicity. An example illustrates the point.
 Example 1 (Efron and Tibshirani 1993): A group of seven mice is assigned medical
 treatment after a test surgery. We would like to study whether this treatment is able to
 6 Cf. Hacking (1965, pp. 83-85).
 7 Cf. Burnham and Anderson (1998) for a practitioner's perspectives.
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 Table 1 Survival times (in days) in the treatment and the control group after the test surgery.
 Survival times 12 34 567 89 Median
 Treatment group 94 197 16 141 38 99 23 - - 94
 Control group 46 30 52 146 40 10 104 27 52 51
 prolong the survival time of the mice, compared to mice which are operated without
 being assigned the treatment. To this end, we set up a control group of nine mice. The
 incoming data are displayed in Table 1 .
 Although the example is very simple, it is not clear how model specification could
 proceed. Certainly, simplicity might speak for choosing a Normal distribution, but
 how do we defend that claim? The asymmetry of the data in the control group speaks
 against the assumption of Normality. Note further that the data points are noted as
 integer values which speaks for a discrete distribution, instead of a continuous one
 like the Normal distribution. Hacking's other guidelines also fail: If the medical treat-
 ment is a novel one, and we choose a parametric model by analogy to an old drug,
 we implicitly impose constraints on our interpretation of the observations, instead of
 taking an unbiased perspective. Finally, in such a complex process as the effect of
 chemical drugs on biological organisms, there is no overarching theory which directly
 links chemical properties of the drug to the survival time of the mice. Thus, model
 specification is quite difficult and risky. Furthermore, having a specific model of drug
 efficacy is arguably less important than knowing that the drug is effective at all and
 that we should administer it in future cases. (Especially if not mice, but humans are
 assigned medical treatment after a serious surgery.)
 The latter goal - predicting future performance - has become especially important
 in modern science. Geophysical and meteorological models provide paradigmatic
 examples. The availability of loads of data on the actual weather together with our
 geophysical theory gives us a sensible idea of the local weather in the next 24 hours.
 But it would be presumptuous to capture the essential structure of complex systems,
 such as the Earth's climate, through explicit, parametric models, even if the underlying
 physics are roughly understood. First, the scale of the model is simply too large to
 warrant that a model parameter can still be meaningfully mapped to a real physical
 quantity (such as moist convection or surface pressure at a particular spot). Second,
 the number of physical interactions in a system that is as complex as Earth's climate
 are so numerous and messy that
 "we know a priori that there is no combination of parametrizations, parameter
 values and initial conditions which would accurately mimic all relevant aspects
 of the climate system."8
 In light of these limitations of parametric statistical modeling, modern science has to
 make recourse to more parsimonious assumptions. In particular, forecasting techniques
 8 (Stainforth et al., 2007, p. 2148). Italics in the original. Cf. Sprenger (2009) for a philosophically minded
 discussion of statistical inference in the face of model uncertainty.
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 that are guided by data (such as mathematical extrapolation techniques) often replace
 predictions that have been gained by a top-down approach and stipulating an explicit
 model.
 Of course, the statistical techniques for detecting model misspecification become
 more and more refined. But their power does not keep up with the increasing model
 complexity in modern science. Thus, shouldn't we better seek for alternative inference
 techniques? In scientific practice, that conclusion is often drawn and exemplifies a trend
 away from explicit models and closed form solutions (cf. Humphreys 2004). This trend
 has even reached statistical physics, one of the most theoretical branches of empirical
 science. I mentioned the great number of analytic results proven for the Brownian
 motion. Still, simulation-based methods such as Monte Carlo methods are nowadays
 omnipresent in studying Brownian motion and related stochastic processes (cf. Sharma
 and Patankar 2004). While the pioneer work in simulating hydrodynamic processes
 goes back to the 1950s (e.g. the Metropolis algorithm), it was the advent of fast and
 efficient computing resources that made simulation-based analyses widely available
 and practicable. So even branches of physics where parametric modeling achieved
 its greatest unifying successes have been infiltrated by numerical, simulation-based
 methods.
 Moreover, statistics that are particularly easy to analyze in parametric models, such
 as the population mean, are notoriously vulnerable to measurement errors, biases and
 outliers in the data. On the other hand, more robust statistics of interest as the median
 are hard to analyze in a parametric framework. All these concerns show that working
 with parametric models does not only have benefits, but also severe drawbacks and
 that we need alternative techniques for addressing classical questions of statistical
 inference, such as causal inference and estimating standard errors. In the next section,
 I illustrate how modeling assumptions can be kept to a bare minimum by means of
 computer-intensive resampling methods. There, the actual sample is taken as a non-
 parametric model of the population. The bootstrap strategy provides a particularly nice
 illustration of the resampling principle and a template for investigating the inferential
 virtues of non-parametric models.
 3 Resampling methods: a bootstrap case study
 One of the most common statistical activities consists in comparing two samples of
 different populations with respect to a specific characteristic. This is called the two-
 sample problem and it is exemplified in Example 1 : we would like to test the hypothesis
 that the medical treatment is not effective at all, i.e. that the two samples (the treatment
 and the control group) are actually drawn from the same distribution. As argued in the
 previous section, we have to test that hypothesis in the face of strong model uncertainty
 and little structural understanding.
 A parametric statistical approach would assign a specific family of distributions to
 the treatment and the control group, for instance a Normal distribution with means
 ß' , ßi and variances a,2, o'. Then, we could apply the Mest for testing equality of
 the means (of Normally distributed populations) and the F-test for testing equality
 of the variances. Since the t- and F-distributions are well studied, such a procedure
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 would be easy to handle. But we have already argued that the assumption of Normality
 would be highly contentious in the mice example - neither underlying scientific the-
 ory nor simplicity nor analogy recommend the choice of a specific model. I show
 how bootstrap resampling transforms the sample into a nonparametric model of the
 population. Hence, it can be used to make inferences about the underlying population
 in the absence of explicit model assumptions, so the modeler 'pulls herself up by her
 own bootstraps'.9
 Let (jti, . . . , xm) denote the survival times in the treatment group and let
 Суь • • • » Уп) denote the survival times in the control group. Let us pool all those
 data into a single sample (jti, . . . , Jtm, y', . . . , yn) and let F denote the empirical
 distribution function (EDF) of the pooled sample. The EDF gives equal probability
 weight 1 /(m + n) to any element of the sample and zero to all other points. Under the
 null hypothesis Ho that the treatment has no effect, all the x¿ and yj are drawn from
 the same population. Given #o, the EDF becomes a non-parametric estimate of the
 joint distribution of the x¡ and yj . I0, 1 1 Now, the resampling mechanism evaluates the
 actual observations under the assumption that Ho is true:12
 1. Let b =1.
 2. Draw with replacement m + n ' bootstrap resamples ' from the distribution F.
 Assign them randomly to an ordered m + n-tuple(¿p yf, ... , y%). (So
 an xb can also be assigned the value of a yj in the original sample, and vice versa.)
 3. Calculate the group means xb and yb for the bootstrap resamples. Then, calculate
 the value of the discrepancy-measuring statistic
 - ХЬ _ У yb «**.]>»):= - ХЬ , _ У yb (1)
 *>/ï , + ï
 where
 " . ' /xr.rf-'V + Zj.iOj-yV " ' V (л-1) + (т-1)
 The denominator in (1) and the complicated expressions in (2) may trouble the
 reader, but they have merely technical significance: The distance statistic xb - yb
 is adjusted by dividing it through an estimate of its standard deviation ('studen-
 tization').
 ^ In spite of the terminology, there is no analogy to Clark Glymour (1980) theory of "bootstrap confirma-
 tion".
 10 The EDF assigns probability zero to all points which are not in the actual sample. Especially in quite
 small samples, this assumption is often ruled out by our background knowledge. In such cases, the EDF
 can be smoothed using adequate techniques, e.g. kernel-dressing.
 1 1 By estimating the unknown population distribution with the EDF of the sample, the bootstrap generalizes
 the principle of maximum likelihood estimation to the nonparametric case. The Glivenko-Cantelli theorem
 guarantees that in the limit, the EDF of the sample converges uniformly against the population distribution.
 12 Cf. Efron and Tibshirani (1993).
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 4. Let b := b H- 1 and go back to step 2 until b = B, the number of bootstrap
 resamples, is attained.
 5. Calculate the fraction of times where the actually observed discrepancy exceeds
 the discrepancy in the bootstrap replications:
 A*, := ^ #{t(xb,yb ) < t(x,y), b<B] (3)
 The rationale of bootstrapping is quickly explained. We would like to test (and possi-
 bly to reject) the null hypothesis that the medical treatment does not have any effect,
 i.e. that treatment and control sample are drawn from the same population. To this end,
 we pool both samples into a single sample and draw simulated resamples out of this
 pooled sample (step 2). For each of these resamples, we check whether the discrep-
 ancy between the two resampled groups exceeds the discrepancy in the original data
 (step 3). Under quite mild conditions, the bootstrap is asymptotically consistent (see
 Efron 1979; Bickel and Freedman 1981), i.e. for increasing sample size (m, n -» oo)
 and an increasing number of resamples ( В - ► oo), the bootstrapped distribution of the
 distance statistic t will mimic the real distribution of t. Thus, we repeat the process a
 large number of times in order to get a reasonably high number of resamples (step 4).
 At the end, we count the fraction of times where the actual discrepancy between the
 group means exceeds the discrepancy in the resamples (step 5). If that happens very
 often, it is unlikely to be a result of pure chance, and the result (i.e. a large value of
 Pobs) will significantly speak against the null hypothesis that the two populations are
 equally distributed.13 In the actual example of table 1, we obtain a p- value (or actual
 significance level) of p ^ = 0.866 for a value of В = 1 ,000. This is clearly not enough
 to reject the hypothesis that the medical treatment is just a placebo since in 13% of all
 cases, such a high result would have been obtained by chance.
 Note that the consistency results for the bootstrap crucially turn on the assump-
 tion that the single data points are independent and identically distributed. Thus, the
 bootstrap is not free of modeling assumptions (cf. Rubin 1981). But the assumptions
 are of a quite different type - they are qualitative and can be warranted with the help
 of a careful experimental setup, controlling that the trials were really screened off
 from each other, etc.. Thus, such assumptions are much easier to defend than specific
 parametric assumptions, and they replace theory- and parameter-based inference by
 design-based inference. In other words, the responsibility for model adequacy lies
 with the experimenter's practical skills rather than with his theoretical understanding.
 This allows a more direct approach to testing scientifically relevant claims, without
 setting up a refined (and possibly misspecified) parametric model.
 Actually, the two-sample problem is characteristic of any situation where two sam-
 ples are compared with respect to some characteristic, as the mean, the variance, etc.
 For instance, we could ask whether the average height of 10-year-old boys equals the
 average height of 10-year-old girls. Or we could ask whether a simulation-based model
 13 The use of p- values in testing point null hypotheses has been subject to severe criticism (Berger and
 Sellke 1987), but it is not necessary to rehearse the Bayesians vs. frequentists debate since the bootstrap
 can be equally applied in a Bayesian framework (Rubin 1981).
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 Table 2 Bootstrap estimates of the standard error of the sample median for the treatment group in Table
 1, as a function of the number of replications B.
 В 50 100 250 500 1,000 oo
 Median
 of a physical process is indeed a faithful model of the target process and compare the
 two data sets to this end. It is a distinctive feature of the bootstrap that it does not only
 apply to the two-sample problem discussed above (equality of two distributions) - it
 can be applied to al ost all statistical inference problems.
 For instance, in the above example, we have tested a causal hypothesis (does the
 treatment have effect?), but De iralp et al. (2008) use the bootstrap as well for assess-
 ing the confidence in the result of a search for causal dependencies. Equally, the
 bootstrap provides a ice means of quantifying the confi ence that we put into a sta-
 tistical estimate, as measured by the standard error of an estimate. Analytic formulas
 for estimating standard errors are in general only available for specific statistics, such
 as the sample mean. In the example of Table 1, we might be more interested in the
 median (4he treatment effect for the average mouse') t an in the mean since outliers
 in the data easily bias the sample mean. Thus, we estimate the population medians
 for the treatment and t e control group by the respective sample medians, leading to
 estimates of x = 94 and у = 51. This is apparently a large effect. However, we should
 acco pany that estimate by an estimation of the standard error in order to quantify
 how much of that difference may be due to random sampling. To this end, we draw
 bootstrap resamples (jcf , . . . , x%) from the treatment group and estimate the standard
 error of the sample median by the standard deviation of the median in the bootstrap
 replications: 14
 '| *= i V j= i /
 Here, xb denotes the median in the b- th bootstrap resample. In other words, we draw a
 large number of resamples from the original sample and look to what extent the repli-
 cated medians diverge from each other under the assumption of independent sampling.
 Then, se is supposed to give a reasonable approximation of the standard error of the
 sample median. Note that bootstrap resampling squeezes out all available informa-
 tion from the sample (by stipulating the sample as a nonparametric model) whereas
 parametric estimation focuses on selected aspects of the data.
 In the mice example, we obtain the numbers shown in Table 2. For В > 500, the
 asymptotics work fine, and in terms of computation time, the effort for the resampling
 analysis is negligible. The observed difference between the sample medians is greater
 than the estimated standard error (to be precise, 1.14 estimated standard errors), but
 again, a difference of that magnitude may still be due to chance alone.
 14 See Chap. 2 in Efron and Tibshirani (1993).
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 Again, we see the simplicity and efficiency of the bootstrap at work. And even on a
 theoretical level, the bootstrap may fare better than a classical, parametric approach.
 Under a large set of conditions, the bootstrap approximation of the standardized sam-
 ple mean outperforms an asymptotic analysis based on the central limit theorem.15 So
 the bootstrap does not only replace parametric approaches whenever their application
 would be problematic or too cumbersome, as in the case of median estimation - it actu-
 ally has theoretical virtues on its own. Given all these successes, it is now time that the
 philosophy of statistical inference acknowledges those developments and integrates
 resampling methods into a unified scheme of data analysis and inductive inference.
 4 Summary and discussion
 For a long time, parametric modeling has been the unchallenged paradigm for induc-
 tive inference in the sciences. As explained in Sect. 1, parametric modeling requires
 some theoretical understanding or knowledge about causal mechanism, but it often
 yields high explanatory power and mathematical convenience. The coin flip model
 and one of its extensions, the random walk, provide a salient example. Hence, a para-
 metric framework is also the natural context for debating principal issues in statistical
 methodology (cf. Mayo 1996; Royall 1997). However, the increasing complexity of
 statistical analysis requires us to focus on nonparametric techniques: The less we
 know about a target system, the greater the scale of the model, or the more opaque
 the interactions between the modeled quantities, the less can parametric assumptions
 be justified and the more likely is our inference to be led astray. Under such circum-
 stances, guidelines for correct model specification, such as background theory and
 analogical reasoning, cease to apply and the goal of adequate modeling may be hard
 or impossible to achieve.
 These criticisms, made explicit in Sect. 2, prompted the question of how classical
 statistical inquiries may be addressed without contentious modeling assumptions. Sec-
 tion 3 drew attention to a particular non-parametric technique: bootstrap resampling.
 Due to its parsimonious presuppositions and its versatile applicability, it deserves spe-
 cial attention. Bootstrap methods draw simulated resamples from the actual data and
 work under much milder conditions, replacing the choice of a particular family of
 distributions by the assumption that the observed random variables are independent
 and identically distributed. This constraint can be satisfied by means of qualitative
 understanding or careful experimentation. In other words, the bootstrap uses the sam-
 ple as a model of the population and exemplifies design-based data analysis , instead
 of theory- or mechanism-based data analysis that is typical of explicit parametric
 modeling. This has general implications for theory testing in science: If a model is
 rejected in a parametric hypothesis test, does this negative result transfer from the
 statistical model to the scientific thesis which we wanted to test? Actually, scientists
 often avoid that conclusion (cf. Keuzenkamp and Magnus 1995). One reason for this
 reluctancy is certainly model uncertainty. This worry might, however, be addressed by
 Cf. Singh (1981).
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 resampling techniques which offer a more direct way to address scientifically relevant
 questions of inquiry.
 To wrap up: Traditional parametric modeling starts with an easily understandable
 model, such as the coin flip model. The properties of such a model are studied and we
 hope that some of our insights transfer to the target system. This is an indirect top-
 down approach - we study a stipulated model before we make inferences about the
 real system. Nonparametric models, however, work bottom-up and combine strategies
 of direct and indirect inference: On the one hand, the model is directly constructed from
 the visible elements of the target population, namely the actual sample. No mediation
 via a toy model or an imagined system is required. On the other hand, we can simu-
 late further experiments within our sparse data model, and by drawing on the results
 of those simulations, we can make reliable scientific inferences. In other words, we
 derive our inferences about real-world phenomena from studying simulated resamples
 that have been generated by a mathematical model. Thus, resampling inferences are
 neither straightforward descriptions nor mere generalizations of observed data - they
 combine direct and indirect inference techniques (cf. Weisberg 2007).
 To some extent, the dichotomy between design-based, bottom-up resampling meth-
 ods and theory-based, top-down parametric methods is blurred in practice. For the
 debate about models in science, it seems to be a fruitful project to explore if the two
 approaches can complement each other. In particular, I would like to investigate how
 the virtues of both approaches - structural understanding in one case; parsimonious,
 design-based inference in the other case - can be combined without being exposed to
 the drawbacks of either strategy. This is, however, a project for future research.
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